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INTRODUCTION: LAW "IN" AND "As" HISTORY
The call to situate law in history itself has a lengthy history. As such, it raises
a few questions worth exploring. What is the specific understanding of history
invoked when we are asked to situate law in history? What are the specific
imagined effects of situating law in history? What has been represented as coming
in the way of situating law in history?
In approaching such questions here, I choose a particular and concrete point
of departure, namely Robert W. Gordon's perceptive article from the mid-1970s,
"J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal
Historiography." Like so much of his other work, Gordon's article captures a
certain mood, even as it points American legal history in precisely the direction it
has ended up taking. In its broad outlines, I submit, the article continues to
represent much mainstream thinking within American legal history.'
Gordon begins his article by distinguishing between what he calls "internal
legal history" and "external legal history." This is how he defines the difference:
The internal legal historian stays as much as possible within the box of
distinctive-appearing legal things; his sources are legal, and so are the
basic matters he wants to describe or explain, such as changes in pleading
rules, in the jurisdiction of a court, the texts assigned to beginning law
students, or the doctrine of contributory negligence. The external
Professor of Law and Dean's Distnguished Scholar, University of Miami School of Law. The
author would like to thank Clayton Koppes, Christopher Tomlins, and the audience at the University
of California, Irvine School of Law ssmposium "JLaw As . . .'. Theory and Method in Legal History"
(April 16-17, 2010) for comments on drafts of this paper. Justin Wales helped with citations.
1. Robert W. Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American
LegalHistoriography, 10 IAW & SOC'Y REv. 9 (1975).
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historian writes about the interaction between the boxful of legal things
and the wider society of which they are a part, in particular to explore the
social context of law and its social effects, and he is usually looking for
conclusions about those effects.
According to Gordon, much American legal history before the appearance of the
work of J. Willard Hurst was "internal," offering the reader nothing more than
chains through which legal phenomena were made sense of in terms of other legal
phenomena, such that any particular legal phenomenon to be historicized could be
traced backward and forward in time. Thanks to the impact of Hurst and others,
Gordon suggests, American legal historians began adopting more "external"
perspectives on law. Giving American law "historicity" means, for Gordon,
"localizing it to specific times and places" and then abstracting those times and
places into social contexts. Gordon concludes the article on a relatively sanguine
note, commenting on "how busily the traffic has been humming across the
drawbridge between law and history." Already in the mid-1970s, in other words,
Gordon is able to read the future: the triumph of "external legal history."2
Toward the end of this introduction, I shall suggest what "external legal
history," to use Gordon's phrase, might have become and how that might be
related to this Symposium's call for us to think "law as . . ." But for now, I would
like to address (a) what Gordon takes to be the origins of "external legal histor"
and (b) what he takes to be the principal obstacle to the development of "external
legal history" for so many decades after thinkers allegedly first hit upon "external
legal history" as an idea.
Gordon very explicitly traces the origins of "external legal history" to
American legal pragmatism, to the writings of legal thinkers such as Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr., Roscoe Pound, and John Dewey. He also is quite clear about
what he blames for impeding the development of "external legal history": the
common law tradition and its enduring grip on the American legal professoriate.
As he puts it toward the end of the article: "This essay has advanced the argument
that the actualization of pragmatic legal theory in historical writing was stunted
and sometimes choked off by the reluctance of legal scholars to shake off their old
roles of interpreters of the common law tradition."3 It is the common law
tradition, in other words, that stood in opposition to the "external legal history"
supposedly inaugurated by American legal pragmatism. I want to explore both
these points in greater detail.
There is no doubt that American legal pragmatism entailed a specific
historical consciousness and that this historical consciousness was deployed to
critical ends. This is clear from a cursory examination of the late nineteenth-
century writings of the individual typically credited with being its "founder,"
2. Id. at 11, 27, 55.
3. Id. at 45.
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Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. History was crucial in Holmes's thinking about law in
general, and the common law in particular. 4
In a series of celebrated writings, Holmes accused the common law tradition
of being impervious to history. First, at the opening of his now little-read classic,
The Common Law, Holmes makes a statement that has since become a cliche of
pragmatist legal thought:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices
which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to
do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through
many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.5
Holmes was arguing that common law thinkers had begun to believe that the
common law could be understood as a matter of ahistorical logic, such that legal
results could be imagined to follow syllogistically from initial premises. But the
common law, Holmes suggested, was irreducible to logic. It could not thus be
systematized. Like all law, the common law had to be seen, instead, as the product
of nothing but history, as something without ahistorical foundations, as something
that had arisen in time.
Second, even as he insisted that the common law was not logic but instead
the product of nothing but history, Holmes argued that the common law was
overly committed to repeating the past. In an essay entitled "The Path of the
Law," Holmes declared that the mere passage of time, or brute antiquity, was an
insufficient basis for endowing a rule with legal weight. He put it thus:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.6
Antiquity, something that had long served as a ground of the common law's
legitimacy, was no foundation for law. A mere "blind imitation of the past" would
not do. If we are to repeat the past, Holmes tells us, it must only be if we choose
to do so now and with utter self-consciousness.
Superficially regarded, Holmes's twin critiques of the common law appear
inconsistent. How could the common law simultaneously be accused of being
excessively wedded to an ahistorical logic and excessively wedded to repeating the
4. 1 have written specifically about Holmes's historical sensibilities in Kunal M. Parker, The
History ofExperience: On the Historical Imagination ofO/ver Wendel Holmes, Jr., 26 POLAR 60 (2003).
5. O.W. HOLTMES JR., THE COMMON LAWN 1 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1881).
6. ) IVER WENDELL HOT MES, The Path ofthe Law, in 3 THE ( COTLTE(CTED WCORKS OF JUSTICE
IIOLMiES 391, 399 (Sheldon Novick ed., Univ. Chi. Press 1995) (1897).
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past blindly? Holmes was, in fact, pointing to different aspects of the common law
tradition as he understood them. The logic-oriented tradition was the product of a
scientific orientation to the common law of relatively recent vintage. It had been
developing around the newly reorganized Harvard Law School at the time Holmes
came of age intellectually. The precedent-oriented tradition, according to which
the legitimacy of the common law rested upon repeating the past, went back
centuries. It had been articulated authoritatively in the early seventeenth century
by thinkers such as Coke and Hale and had been repeatedly reaffirmed.
What reconciles Holmes's twin critiques of the common law is his
antifoundational conception of history. For Holmes, history is the largely negative
practice of revealing the merely temporal origins of phenomena in order to
dismantle the foundations upon which such phenomena rest, whether those
foundations be the logic allegedly underlying law or the accumulated weight of
law's past that authorizes its own repetition. Once the temporal origins of
phenomena have been revealed and their foundations taken apart, no underlying
order becomes visible. History possesses no necessary or coherent direction or
meaning, no directing arc of movement. It simply sweeps away foundations, clears
ground, and invites self-reflection. Law's foundations may be dismantled in the
name of history; but we are given no substitute foundations. Instead, we are
told-as members of a democratic society-to think collectively about what we
might want law to be.
It is this antifoundational conception of history that Gordon has in mind
when he places Holmes at the origin of what he calls "external legal history."
When Gordon talks about the importance of "localizing [law] to specific times and
places," and of placing it in social-historical context, I submit, it is not because
Gordon is operating with a rigorous theoretical notion of the "social," but because
specifying temporal, spatial, and social context is a way of demolishing law's
pretended atemporal foundations, its pretended claim to autonomy, its insistence
on its imperviousness to its outside.
As for Holmes, for Gordon, history serves a negative function and it serves
that function against a well-defined enemy: law's claim to self-sufficiency,
exemplified for Gordon by common law ideology. Put in terms familiar to legal
scholars, history for Gordon is ultimately a means of eroding the famed law-
politics distinction. In undermining law's autonomy, history reveals law to be a
kind of politics, such that law might be remade in accordance with society's
desires, might be a product of democratic will. This is clear from Gordon's
approving description of the historical consciousness of Holmes and Pound: "The
role of history [for Holmes and Pound] was the important but auxiliary one of
clearing away the rubbish of pointless old law."7
Albeit in a different vocabulary, other prominent American legal historians
7. Gordon, supra note 1, at 30.
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have endorsed Gordon's account of the origins of "external legal history" by
placing Holmes at the origin point of the "discovery" that law could be collapsed
into politics. At the end of a brilliant and detailed discussion of Holmes, for
example, Morton Horwitz puts it thus:
[H]olmes pushed American legal thought into the twentieth century. It is
the moment at which advanced legal thinkers renounced the belief in a
conception of legal thought independent of politics and separate from
social reality. From this moment on, the late nineteenth century ideal of
an internally self-consistent and autonomous system of legal ideals, free
from the corrupting influence of politics, was brought constantly under
attack."
"External legal history"-which we might allegedly trace back to Holmes
and other legal pragmatists-is, then, nothing other than the practice of revealing
law to be nonautonomous, hence political, by situating it in context. The actual
context matters less, I would argue, than the effect of the contextualization
(robbing law of much of its autonomy, showing law to be politics, hence showing
it to be changeable, so that it can be opened up to democratic fashioning).
Let me turn now to Gordon's second observation, namely that legal scholars
schooled in the common law tradition came in the way of the full flowering of
"external legal history." Gordon is undoubtedly correct that various twentieth-
century legal scholars, such as Roscoe Pound and Karl Llewellyn, even as they
began with a commitment to thinking historically and to placing law outside of
itself, made a certain "conservative turn" toward the end of their careers and
ended up reverting to the common law tradition. He is also correct, indeed highly
acute, when he argues that various legal figures commonly praised for fighting
legal formalism-Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., John Chipman Gray, Roscoe Pound,
Jerome Frank, and Karl Llewellyn-all contributed, because of the extreme law-
centeredness of their writings and their excessive emphasis on case law, to
reinforcing law's "internal" sensibilities, and to reinforcing the common law
tradition's sense of autonomy, continuity, and antiquity. I would extend that
charge further than Gordon does, to encompass a great deal of what passed for
Critical Legal Studies around the Harvard Law School in the last third of the
twentieth century. In the work of scholars from Duncan Kennedy to Morton
Horwitz, much history is made to turn on miniscule shifts in legal doctrine. A
change in a theory of legal causation or negligence stands in for massive historical
transformations of enormous import.
Despite this apparent thwarting of the promise of "external legal history" by
the common law tradition, Gordon would undoubtedly approve of certain
developments commonly attributed to the Holmesian erosion of the law-politics
8. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TR\NSFORM\TON OF AMERC\N LAW, 1870-1960: THT-E
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORIIIODOXY 142 (1992).
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distinction in the name of antifoundational history. Gordon would likely not
disagree that the Holmesian erosion of the law-politics distinction played a critical
role in the increase in democratic control over the law and in the decline of the
relative prestige of the common law as a mode of governance and public
discourse. Following in Holmes's footsteps, Progressive-era thinkers railed against
the common law's late nineteenth-century formalist orientation. For example, in
his celebrated An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, the
historian Charles A. Beard criticized "[t]he devotion to deductions from
'principles[,]' ... which is such a distinguishing sign of American legal thinking...."9
Progressive-era thinkers also followed Holmes in assailing the common law's
traditional backward orientation, its commitment to repeating the past. Law was
increasingly thought of as something that had to be made in the present, with full
awareness of its contingency, provisionality, and revisability. This present-focused
law had to rely, furthermore, on the latest expert knowledge of nonlawyers. As
John Dewey put it in a brief 1941 essay, law required that "intelligence, employing
the best scientific methods and materials available, be used, to investigate, in terms
of the context of actual situations, the consequences of legal rules and of
proposed legal decisions and acts of legislation.""' Various early twentieth-century
schools of legal thought-Sociological Jurisprudence, Legal Realism, and so on-
flourished at least in important part on the foundations of Holmesian insights. In
a series of developments related to these early twentieth-century intellectual
trends, the conservative, common law-centered, antiredistributive constitutional
jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court, exemplified by cases such as Lochner P.
New York, gave way by the 1930s to the capitulation of the Court to the forces of
the New Deal. Law in the United States would increasingly be a matter of state-
generated law: codes, administrative agencies, bureaucratic actors, and so on. The
reduction of law to politics had the effect, in other words, of allowing
democratically elected authorities (i.e., those properly invested with the task of
doing politics) to exercise greater control over law. To be sure, this triumph of
democracy over the forces of the common law, as Gordon and others have
accurately observed, was not complete. This has not stopped the proliferation of a
triumphalist narrative, celebrated by progressive legal scholars and taught to law
students across the United States as part of the history of American democracy
and its relationship to law.11
Gordon might find something to celebrate as well in another development,
one that he predicted as the wave of the future in the mid-1970s and that he
9. CARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INIERPRET AlION OFI' THECO11W(NSTITIIlION OF IIE
UNITED STATFS 9 (1913).
10. John Dewey, My Philosophy of Law, in MY PILOSOPHIY OF LA\: CREDOS OF SIXT EEN
AMER TCAN SCHOLARS 71, 84 (photo. reprint 1987) (1941).
11. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); HORWITZ, supra note 8, offers a good
discussion of the developments discussed in this paragraph.
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himself has played such a prominent role in bringing to pass: the growing presence
of legal historians, often with training in professional history, on law faculties.
"External legal history" of the kind Gordon called for is fully present now on law
faculties. Gordon's 1997 Stanford Law Review introductory essay, entitled "The
Arrival of Critical Historicism," testifies to his recognition of this triumph.12 Even
if "external legal history"-despite having "arrived"-is far from dominant on law
faculties, furthermore, most legal academics are fully aware of the possibility of
eroding the law-politics distinction in the name of antifoundationalism and of
diminishing law's autonomy in the name of history. "We are all Realists now," the
clich6 goes. Any attempt to restore the law-politics distinction must take place, as
it were, after Holmes, after the possibility of looking at law from the outside.
However, if there is much to celebrate when it comes to a certain triumph of
"external legal history"-which I have, through a reading of Gordon, traced to the
antifoundational historical thought of Holmes-there might also be cause for a
measure of hesitancy. And it is this that brings me to the subject of this
Symposium.
When Gordon wrote in the mid-1970s, he wrote as someone situated in the
law school context, fully aware of the power of "internal legal history" in his
immediate professional surroundings and convinced of the exciting intellectual
possibilities of "external legal history." It was not just law that had to be related to
something outside of itself, one imagines, but the law professor as well. A quarter
century after the appearance of Gordon's article, particularly from the perspective
of legal scholars trained in the humanities and social sciences who have acquired a
berth on law faculties, the call to contextualize law, to place it "in" history as a way
of diminishing its autonomy and of showing it to be a species of politics-or
social context read as politics-seems entirely familiar. For historians engaged
with the discipline of history, situating law in its social-historical context to achieve
a variety of effects-to demonstrate its contingency, to reveal its politics, to
underscore its imbrication in power relations, to hint at the possibility of its being
remade, and so on and so forth-has been thoroughly normalized. As scholarship
relentlessly historicizing law pours out, offering us endlessly complex pictures of
law's past and pointing to the plurality of missed opportunities in the past (all of
which are supposed to mirror the open possibilities of the future), one cannot
help but experience a sense of intellectual exhaustion.1' The theme of this
symposium-to think of "law as . . ." rather than "law and" (which is another
12. Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: The Ardval of Critical Historidsm, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1023
(1997)(emphasis added).
13. Out of a similar sense of exhaustion with the cultural study of law, Annelise Riles has
called for a turn to legal technicalities. Annelise Riles, A New Agendafor the Cultural Stud ofLaw: Taking
on the Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 973 (2005). 1 have written of the relentless "complexity" of
contemporary historical scholarship in Kunal M. Parker, Context in Law andHistory: The Late Nineteenth
Cen tur American furiprudence of Custom, 24 LAW & I lisi. REv. 473 (2006).
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name for "law in," or what Gordon might call "external legal history)-stems
from a deep sense of intellectual fatigue, of a sense that it might be important to
begin looking elsewhere, to rejuvenate our thinking, to explore other possibilities
not offered by our current dominant modes of contextualization.
I am not certain that I can point a way out of our current intellectual stasis
(and it is important to observe that not everyone agrees that this is a time of
intellectual stasis). However, in what follows, I hope to question some of
Gordon's distinctions: "internal legal history" versus "external legal history"; a
historical/democratic/political sensibility versus the common law tradition; and
ultimately (something raised by the conference that gave rise to this Symposium)
"law and" versus "law as." I do so by offering a brief account of the relationships
between democracy, history, and the common law tradition from the end of the
American Revolution to about 1900, when the antifoundational historical thinking
inaugurated by Holmes-the source of what Gordon calls "external legal
history"-began to acquire steam. As I shall make clear, the version of "law as" I
present here is a rather specific one.
This account I present is a summary of an argument I explore at
considerable length in my book Common Lax, History, and Democrag in America,
1790-1900: Legal Thought Before Modernism.14 Accordingly, I avoid extensive
citations here and direct the reader to the book for a fuller and better
substantiated version of what is presented below. In the most orthodox historical
tradition, I show that the past-in this case, the past before Holmesian
antifoundational historical thinking-was different. In the conclusion to this
paper, I will offer some speculations as to what might inhere in showing that the
past was different.
II. THE COMMON LAWIN THE AMERICAN POLITY: 1790-1900
From the American Revolution until the very end of the nineteenth century,
the common law was an integral mode of governance and public discourse in
America. The vital presence of the common law might seem puzzling in a country
premised in so many ways on breaking with its European past and on assuming
political control of its own destiny. After all, the common law had originated in,
and remained closely identified with, England. It was ideologically committed to
upholding precedent and to repeating the past, claiming as it did so to embody the
"immemorial" customs of the English, customs so old that their origin supposedly
lay beyond "the memory of man." It consisted of judicial, rather than legislative,
articulation of legal principles. For all these reasons, one might expect Americans,
who were intensely proud of their fledgling republican experiment, to have
rejected the common law.
14. KUL N\T M. PARKER, COMMTION LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMAOCRACY IN AMERRCA, 1790-
1900: LECAL IHOUC IIT BEFoE MODERNNISM (2011).
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Instead, in contrast to the concerted effort to uproot all traces of the past
that took place in revolutionary France, from the Revolution until the very end of
the nineteenth century, the common law was widely-although never
universally-claimed and celebrated. To advance just one example, in 1826, in the
first volume of his celebrated Commentaries on American Law, the "American
Blackstone," James Kent, delivered the following breathless paean to the common
law that captures how many nineteenth-century American lawyers thought about
it:
[The common law] fills up every interstice, and occupies every wide space
which the statute law cannot occupy. ... [W]e live in the midst of the
common law, we inhale it at every breath, imbibe it at every pore; we
meet with it when we wake, and when we lie down to sleep, when we
travel and when we stay at home; and it is interwoven with the very idiom
that we speak; and we cannot learn another system of laws, without
learning, at the same time, another language.15
We might account for the longevity and resilience of the common law
tradition in nineteenth-century America by advancing at least two reasons, both
very well known in the historiography. First, the common law came with heavy
ideological freight. It was associated with the very heart of Anglo-American
freedom. Since the early seventeenth century, English common lawy ers had
resisted the encroachments of would-be absolute Stuart monarchs in the name of
England's "ancient constitution," itself an agglomeration of immemorial, endlessly
repeated, common law freedoms. Americans had thoroughly absorbed this
learning. As John Phillip Reid has argued at considerable length, the American
revolutionary struggle was fought in important part to vindicate what colonists
considered their common law rights and freedoms.' 6 As a result, many prominent
American legal thinkers from the late eighteenth century on considered the written
U.S. Constitution to be informed by, and indeed to be incomprehensible without
reference to, the common law. U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice David
Brewer, who served on the Court from 1889 to 1910, is just one among many
lawyers and judges who expressed this view. When "interpreting the
Constitution," Brewer observed, "we must have recourse to the common law."1 '
The common law, Brewer argued in his landmark opinion in Kansas v. Colorado,
15. 1 JAIIES KENT, COMIENTARIES ON AMERICAN L\\ 342-43 (E.B. Clayton, 4th ed.
1840). It is noteworthy that Kent makes an argument that many contemporary socio-legal thinkers
would recognize, namely, that law is utterly constitutive of our lives, down to their most mundane,
routine, habitual aspects. For contemporary legal scholars, the authoritative work on the constitutive
nature of law is that of Robert W. Gordon, C aLega lHistories, 36 SIAN. L. REv. 57 (1984).
16. See JOHN PHITlLIP REID, THE ANCIENT (CONSTITUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF ANGLO-
AMERICAN LIBERY (2005); see also Reid's multivolume Constitutional History ofthe American Revolution.
1-4 JOHN PHTiTIP REID, THE CONSTITTTIONA\T HISTORY OF THE AIERICAN REVOT ION
(1986-2003).
17. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 449 (1905)
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"does not rest on any statute or other written declaration of the sovereign"; its
"principles" were "in force generally throughout the United States.""
Second, throughout the nineteenth century, the American state-whether at
the federal, state, or local levels-did not play nearly as significant a role in
economy and society as it would in the twentieth century This is true
notwithstanding recent scholarship that has emphasized the ubiquity of extensive
regulation in nineteenth-century America. 19 The vacuum left by the state was filled
by common lawyers, who played a correspondingly larger part in articulating law
for America's vibrant, dynamic and multiplying polities and economies. Even as
they were accused of political bias, nineteenth-centurs American common lawyers
took this role as guardians of America's economies and societies extremely
seriously. Over a quarter century ago, Morton Horwitz detailed the considerable
creativity of American common lawyers as they reshaped English doctrines of
tort, contract, and property to suit the needs of the nineteenth-century American
economy. Scholars such as Howard Schweber have made much the same point
more recently.20
But there was also more. Throughout the nineteenth century, the common
law, history, and democracy were imagined as coexisting in ways very different
from the way we are now wont to imagine them. These nineteenth-century ways
of imagining the relationships among the common law, history, and democracy
explain a great deal about why the common law tradition survived for as long as it
did as such a vital part of American governance and public discourse. They show
us different conceptions of how law, history, and democracy related to one
another; different modes of historicizing law; and different ways of thinking about
history itself. They suggest-and this is the core of my argument-that the law-
politics problem as we imagine it today (i.e., as intimately related to an
antifoundational Holmesian historical consciousness) was not a problem for many
nineteenth-centur Americans.
The ideational world of the nineteenth century was a world in which the
notion of given constraints was very real indeed. In other words, this was not a
world in which the subject-whether an individual, a group, or a society-
ordinarily deemed itself free to act entirely as it pleased, to reimagine the world in
a thoroughgoing way. This is true even of the radical democratic voices to be
heard from the American Revolution going forwards. One valid explanation for
the persistence of a sense of the givenness of constraints is that, even though
Americans had long ceased to enact Biblical strictures as law by the time of the
18. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 96 (1907).
19. WITITAM J. NOVAK, THE PvIRoE'S WEI F\RE: A \ND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTI I-CENTRY A\EICA (1996).
20. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TR\NSFORM\TON OF AM[ERIC\N LW, 1780-1860 (1977);
HORNITZ, supra note 8; HOWARD SCHNTBER, THE CRETIION OF AM'AERIC\N COIION LAW,
1850-1880 (2004).
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Revolution, this was a society that remained overwhelmingly religious. 21 However,
the presence of religion in nineteenth-century American thought, if offered up as a
definitive and all-encompassing explanation for the givenness of constraints, risks
becoming monolithic and reductionist. Even though it can always be identified as
a presence, it often fails to capture the changing, proliferating, and complex ways
in which nineteenth-century Americans went about constructing their worlds and
naming its limits and constraints.
For our purposes, what is important is how nineteenth-century Americans
imagined the scope of political democracy, the formal sphere of the political. This
sphere, which would be called upon to do so much work in twentieth-century
America, was often imagined as constrained. But it is the kinds of limits that were
imagined, and the ways in which those limits were made to interact with each
other, that are ultimately of interest to me.22
When it comes to nineteenth-century understandings and representations of
political democracy, it is important to keep in mind a cardinal fact, one that we
tend too often to ignore. From the American Revolution into the twentieth
century, throughout the Western world, political democracy, even as it was an
aspiration for millions, was new and exceptional and not necessarily viewed as a
prerequisite to national prosperity, achievement, or prominence. The explosive
eruptions and vicissitudinous careers of various revolutions-the late eighteenth-
century American, French, and Haitian Revolutions; the Latin American struggles;
the revolutions of 1848; various slave insurrections; and the Paris Commune, to
name just a few in the West-underscored political democracy's instability,
unpredictability, violence, and dangerousness.
It should not be at all surprising, then, that political democracy was the
object of deep, sustained suspicion. As is very well known, this suspicion lay at the
heart of the republican tradition that gave rise to the elaborate structure of checks
and balances in the U.S. Constitution. But it continued into the nineteenth century
long after the preoccupation with republicanism began to fade. Thinkers strove
mightily to ponder political democracy's limits, to conjure up truths that the
democratic subject, in his arrogant assertion that he could remake his world
through self-conscious political activity, would be unable to tamper with. The
mid-century Scottish Romantic conservative historical thinker Thomas Carlyle
offered the catchiest formulation, one that enjoyed considerable currency
21. For a recent article on the issue that adopts a comparative perspective and introduces the
reader to much of the relevant literature, see Richard J. Ross, Puritan Godly Disailine in Comparativ
PerFpective: Legal Pluradsm and the Sources of 'Jntensit," 113 AM. IIIST. REV. 975 (2008). A good starting
place is GEORGE L. IASKINS, L\\ AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY \LASSACI1USETlS (1960).
22. 1 am not talking about constraints on political democracy in the narrow sense of Lockean
natural rights, but about a broader set of constraints that operated, at a philosophical level, as given.
Indeed, my argument about the givenness of constraints supports, rather than contradicts, William
Novak's discussion of nineteenth-century America as a "well-regulated society." See Nov\TK, supra
note 19.
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throughout the English-speaking world. Carlyle analogized the nation to a ship
that had to round Cape Horn. Was the establishment of political democracy
among the crew of the ship sufficient to negotiate this confrontation with an
inexorable, limiting, and given nature? Carlyle's answer was unequivocal:
Your ship cannot double Cape Horn by its excellent plans of voting. The
ship may vote this and that, above decks and below, in the most
harmonious exquisitely constitutional manner: the ship, to get round
Cape Horn, will find a set of conditions already voted for, and fixed with
adamantine rigour, by the ancient Elemental Powers, who are entirely
careless how you vote.... Ships accordinglr do not use the ballot-box at all; ...
one wishes much some other Entities,-since all entities lie under the same norous set
of laws,-could be brought to show as much wisdom, and sense at least of self-
preservation, the first command of Nature.... [Democrag' is] a very extraordinary
method of navigating, whether in the Straits of Magellan or the undiscovered Sea of1
Time.23
"Nature" or "ancient Elemental Powers," in Carlyle's formulation, consisted of "a
set of conditions already voted for, and fixed with adamantine rigor" that operated
as an absolute limit on political democracy.
But one should not imagine that the world of the nineteenth century was one
in which limits to political democracy were necessarily self-consciously conjured
up only by those ideologically opposed to it. What we might take to be a limiting
or cabining of political democracy was in fact often merely taken to be an actually
existing feature of political democracy, nothing other than the order of things
itself. Throughout the nineteenth century, American political and legal thinkers
(indeed, thinkers all over the West) were acutely aware of political democracy's
manifest-and to many, necessary or inevitable-incompleteness, even in those
very few countries, such as the United States, that claimed to be democracies.
They were fully aware, for example, that large segments of the American
population-a changing group that included women, minors, African Americans,
Native Americans, propertyless white males-were not full participants in the
polity but were nevertheless subject to its laws. They were also aware that only limited
numbers of even those Americans entitled to vote actually voted in elections.
They were also conscious of how much of the rest of the world was non-self-
governing.
While some saw this incompletion as the basis for demanding an extension
or deepening of political democracy, others did not think this incompletion made
American political democracy less democratic, but instead that it underscored the
fundamentally or essentially nondemocratic-or, better put, non-self-chosen-
nature of law. This in turn fed the sense of constraints on political democracy, a
Burkean sense of the inevitability of subjection to a governing order that one had
23. THO[\MAS C\RLIYIE, The Present Time, in L\TTER-D\Y PA\M'PHILETS 20-21 (Chapman and
IIall 1870) (1850) (emphasis added).
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not arrived at through a self-conscious process of working through abstract
principles. This is precisely the kind of argument Joseph Story made in his
celebrated Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, a work written to
defend the "implied powers" jurisprudence of the Marshall Court and to oppose
the "compact theor" that was increasingly popular in Jacksonian America.
"Implied powers," of course, were those powers that had not been expressly
delegated to the government by the people. The "compact theory," by contrast,
rested on the idea that power originally belonged to the people or the states, and
that government possessed only such powers as had been expressly delegated. The
theory one adhered to had a great deal to do with whether or not one believed law
to be self-given.
According to Joseph Story, no contemporary American state had in fact
been founded upon the assent of a majority of its population. In other words,
governmental power had not been created through voluntary contract or
contemporaneous consent (grounds of the compact theory), but was ubiquitous,
always already there. This was evident if one looked around and saw how
subjection to power actually worked. Individuals generally did not assent to the
societies they were part of; they were born into such societies already subject to
their rules. Story put it thus, "The assent of minors, of women, and of unqualified
voters has never been asked or allowed; jet these embrace a majority of the whole
population in eyery organiged society, and are governed by its existing institutions."24 The
demonstrable imperfection of consent and contract as grounds of political power
was true not only of the states, but also of the national government:
In respect to the American Revolution itself, it is notorious that it was
brought about against the wishes and resistance of a formidable minority
of the people; and that the declaration of independence never had the
universal assent of the inhabitants of the country. So, that this great and
glorious change in the organization of our government owes its whole
authority to the efforts of a triumphant majority. And the dissent on the
part of the minority was deemed in many cases a crime . . . . 25
In Joseph Story we have, then, perhaps the most prominent and erudite American
legal thinker of his day insisting upon the fundamentally non-self-given nature of
law, based upon his apprehension that the vast majority of Americans-in a
philosophical register, he would very likely even have included himself-were
largely voiceless when it came to matters of politics and law. Why, in such a
situation, should powers not be implied on behalf of government?
This received sense that the world lay, in crucial ways, beyond the power of
the democratic subject to remake, that it was subject to laws not of his making,
24. 1JOSEPIIHSTORY,COM\IENIARIESONllL( (NS'TIUIION OF1 1IE UNIIEDS'iTES236
(Melvillc M. Bigelow ed., William S. Hem & Co. 5th ed., photo. reprint 1994) (1891) (emphasis
added).
25. Id. at 298.
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imbues nineteenth-century American political and legal discourses. It allowed
political democracy to coexist, as a result, with various kinds of constraints or
limits, most of which we would today reject for their illegitimate foundations. A
large number of these imagined constraints on the politico-legal sphere were
temporal, constraints of the past and of the future. The politico-legal sphere was
crowded with times ahistorical and historical, times with mysterious origins, times
with a given logic and direction and meaning that democracy was declared unable
to subvert. For our purposes, two different kinds of given times that enjoyed
considerable currency as limits to the sphere of political democracy were the
nonhistorical premodern times of the common law, on the one hand, and the
changing teleological and foundational times of nineteenth-century history, on the
other.
Let me begin first with the nonhistorical time of the common law. From the
seventeenth century on, the English common law tradition had claimed for itself
the self-consciously nonhistorical time of "immemoriality." The origins of the
common law were said to reach back to a time "beyond the memory of man." The
"memory of man" was formally stated to extend no further back than 1189 C.E.,
but this precise chronology belies the uses to which the formula was typically put.
The time of "immemoriality" was self-consciously deployed to set the common
law beyond historical specification or determination. It was precisely a resistance
to history that common lawyers relied upon to claim legitimacy for the common
law. Freed from the strictures of a law that could be pinned down in
chronological, historical time, common lawyers could claim a diffuse, imprecise,
and mysterious antiquity on behalf of an "immemorial" common law. This special
and mysterious antiquity allowed them to claim superiority vis- -vis law-giving acts
that could be located in mere chronological time, such as acts of monarchs or,
later, legislatures. Such temporally delimited acts of monarchs and legislatures,
common lawyers argued, could never possess the wisdom of a law that embodied
the diffuse and collective wisdom of multiple generations going back into the
mists of time. In the various ways in which the time of "immemoriality" was
deployed against monarchs and legislatures, one sees the precise import, albeit
twisted around, of Gordon's call to localize law to specific times and places. In the
seventeenth century, when thinkers such as Coke and Hale articulated the
temporality of "immemoriality," to have made law the creature of a specific time
and place was to have implied that it could be remade. This argument, so readily
claimed by modern legal thinkers seeking to break down the wall between law and
politics, was the argument of royalists seeking to give monarchs the power to
remake law. The nonhistorical temporality of the common law was a gesture of
resistance. 26
26. The authoritative discussion of seventeenth-century common law thought, with a
discussion of "immemoialitv" and its relationship to history, remains J.G.A. POCOCTK, THE ANCIENT
CONSTITUTION AND THlE FELDAL LA\: A STUDY OF ENGLISH 1ISTORICAL THOUCIIT IN THlE
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The "immemoriality" of the common law did not mean that, in the hands of
common lawyers, the common law was immune to change. Even as they
maintained that the common law was "immemorial" and possessed of a diffuse
and imprecise antiquity that lay beyond historical specification, seventeenth-
century common lawyers hailed the common law's ability to respond to changing
circumstances through recourse to the time of "insensibility." The common law
changed so "insensibly," it was maintained, that it could never be seen to change.
In his HistoU of the Common Law ofEngland, Sir Matthew Hale put it thus:
From the Nature of Laws themselves in general, which being to be
accommodated to the Conditions, Exigencies and Conveniencies of the
People, for or by whom they are appointed, as those Exigencies and
Conveniencies do insensib/j grow upon the People, so many Times there
grows insensib/j a Variation of the Laws, especially in a long Tract of
Time; and hence it is, that tho' for the Purpose of in some particular Part
of the Common Law of England, we may easily say, That the Common
Law, as it is now taken, is otherwise than it was in that particular Part or
Point in the Time of Hen. 2. when Glanville wrote, or than it was in the
time of Hen. 3. when Bracton wrote, Vet it is not possible to assign the
certain Time when the Change began .... 27
For Hale, the common law's "insensible" changing was not so much the
consequence of a lack of supporting records, but instead an assertion about how
the common law changed in general, in short, a claim about its method. It was the
gradual and partial nature of its changes, a step-by-step process in which identity
and difference were collapsed, that made it meaningful to describe the
changeability of the common law as "insensible." Thus, Hale continued in a
famous passage:
But tho' those particular Variations and Accessions have happened in the
Laws, yet the being only patial and successive, we may with just Reason say,
They are the same English Laws now, that they were 600 Years since in
the general. As the Argonauts Ship was the same when it returned home,
as it was when it went out, tho' in that long Voyage it had successive
Amendments, and scarce came back with any of its former Materials; and
as Titius is the same Man he was 40 Years since, tho' Physicians tells us,
That in a Tract of seven Years, the Body has scarce any of the same
Material Substance it had before.28
"Insensibility" did the critical work, then, of recognizing difference and change
and yet insisting on identity and continuity. This was, in other words, also a time
impervious to chronological or historical specification or determination. The
precise moment of the common law's changing could never be located in
SEVENIEENTII CENIURY (1959).
27. MATTHEN HATF, HISTORY OF THE COMION Law 39-40 (Charles M1. Gray ed., Univ.
Chi. Press 1971) (1739).
28. Id. at 58-59.
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chronological time; change could only be inferred by comparing origin and end
points. And once again, common lawyers used this time as proof of the common
law's superiority. Because it was "insensible," whatever change the common law
brought about was less abrupt, less disruptive, and less violent, they argued, than
the sudden and ill-conceived changes introduced by monarchs and legislatures.
It was precisely the indistinctness and imprecision of these times of
"immemoriality" and "insensibility" that American lawyers would claim, albeit in
complicated ways, throughout the nineteenth century. It was precisely these times
that gave the common law its authority. To nineteenth-century American common
law thinkers, the Benthamite charge that common law judges made law as they
pleased was simply an illegitimate aspersion. To them, the common law was an
inherited body of "immemorial" doctrine that commanded a measure of fidelity
because of its antiquity and its association with Anglo-American freedoms. But
this was never a blind or unthinking fidelity. Above all, the common law was a
method-indeed, the best, most scientific, and least despotic method-of
"insensible," step-by-step lawmaking. At a time when legislatures were partial and
nonrepresentative affairs, the common law judge was uniquely privileged, far more
so than any elected legislature, to "read" the community that presented itself to
him in his courtroom. When the common law judge spoke, in other words, the
common law corresponded perfectly to the actually existing state of the
community. This was a view that had emerged in seventeenth-century England
and that was held by prominent American common law thinkers throughout the
nineteenth century, from Joseph Story to Thomas Cooley to the younger Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr. Furthermore, the common law judge decided case by case,
unwilling to turn his back on the past or to plunge headlong into the future. As
such, the common law judge was committed to a careful calibration of the
competing claims of the past, the present, and the future, of maintaining the
identity of society over time even as he was committed to change. This was also a
view repeated by nineteenth-century common law thinkers, from Francis Lieber in
Jacksonian America to James Coolidge Carter at the very end of the nineteenth
century. When these features of the common law method were combined, it was
democratically elected legislatures, rather than common law judges, that appeared
"unscientific" in their lawmaking. Nineteenth-century American political
democracy shared space, as it were, with a law that began but could not be seen to
have begun, that changed but that could not be caught in the act of changing, that
always embodied the current needs of the people even as it reflected the wisdom
of an illimitable past. In other words, political decision making, which took place
in historical time, was constrained by a law that unfolded outside historical time.
To many, this was not the contradiction that it appears to be to us.
The second kind of time that limited the scope of nineteenth-century
American political democracy was the time-or rather multiple and changing
times-of teleological and foundational history. Through much of the nineteenth
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century, history was not self-consciouslv antifoundational as it would become with
Oliver Wendell Holmes and his modernist, pragmatist champions. When one
contemplated the historical world, one did not see it, as many historians are now
(apparently) accustomed to seeing it, as the product of nothing but history, as one
historically locatable phenomenon giving way to another. One saw it instead in
terms of the logic of a number of "firsts" that underlay the passage of time and
that gave it meaning: God, "spirit," "laws," "life," and so on. There has been a
powerful tradition in American intellectual history that has charged American
historical thought with inadequacy or insufficiency or weakness. Eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century Americans were too mired in a sense of their own
exceptionalism, we have been told, to understand their historical world as
genuinely historical (i.e., as devoid of foreordained directionality). 29 This sense that
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Americans were committed to teleological and
foundational conceptions of history is largely correct, although they were hardly
unique in such commitments. But to say this does not capture the richness of
nineteenth-century historical discourses. Regardless of the overwhelmingly
foundational and teleological nature of nineteenth-century history, discussions
about history, and about America's place in history, were vigorous. They were also
decidedly not provincial: they employed vocabularies and structures that were in
use in Europe as well. Furthermore, even though nineteenth-century Americans
organized the historical world in terms of firsts and foundations, they did not
necessarily agree with one another about what constituted the logic of history.
There were many different accounts of what history was about, of where it was
headed.
Teleological and foundational ideas of history were applied to American
democracy from the American Revolution going forward. Even as many in the
nineteenth century saw democracy as furnishing the logic of history, to the extent
that history was imagined to possess an underlying logic and meaning and
direction, it could equally serve as a check on democracy. If history was going
somewhere, in other words, it was possible to judge the activities of a
democratically elected legislature in terms of that logic. Thus judged, a legislature
could be "wrong" in the sense that it was guilty of flouting the logic of history. Let
us take the example of slavery. Proslavery thinkers in the mid-nineteenth century
believed that slavery instantiated the natural "law" of subordination of blacks to
whites. History proved this natural law. One could look at the subordination of
blacks to whites across temporal and geographic contexts and conclude this. But it
also implied that American democracy could not violate this natural law.
Antislavery legislation was thus represented as an exception to this law, as
something that went against the logic of history itself. Antislavery thinkers
29. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELITAN IOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL
THOtGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBIC\N TRADITION (1975). The authoritative work for the
nineteenth centur is DOROTHYX )ROSS, THEk ORIGINS OF \IERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE(1991).
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employed the same logic, but to the opposite end. Proslavery legislation and the
recognition of slavery in the U.S. Constitution violated the natural "law" of
equality.3 On both sides of the slavery debate, in other words, the space of
democratic activity was cabined or limited by the logic imagined to imbue history.
One could multiply examples of how teleological and foundational ideas of history
were used to limit the space of political democracy. History could be the shift
from the feudal to the commercial; the movement of the "spirit of the age"; the
transition from "status" to "contract"; or the trajectory of Darwinian-Spencerian
"life." Each, in different ways, acted as a constraint on what political democracy
could do.
Thus far, I have been arguing, political democracy in nineteenth-century
America coexisted with two sets of constraining or limiting times, those of the
common law and those of foundational and teleological history. It is in the
intersection of these times that we see how common lawyers made out the case
for the centrality of the common law as an important mode of governance in
America and why they were not troubled by our law-politics problem. It is in the
intersection of these two times, as well, that we see how what Gordon would call
"internal legal history" and "external legal history" were combined and separated.
Nineteenth-century American common lawyers-following in the wake of
their seventeenth- and eighteenth- century English and Scottish counterparts-
were fully historical thinkers. From their own perspective, they were not engaged
in a surreptitious or unthinking "political" reshaping of common law doctrine (to
be sure, this is something their opponents accused them of from time to time and
something that we-with our historically informed law-politics problem-see
them as doing). Instead, they were openly, articulately, vigorously, and self-
consciously trying to fit the common law to the imperatives of history as they and
their contemporaries saw them, imperatives that were imagined to constrain
American democracy itself. This common lawyerly turn to history was not just a
defensive strategy against the common law's many critics (although it was also
that), but a deeply felt position. Where legislatures seemed unable or unwilling to
guide America along history's imagined path, or simply seemed to lack the
expertise to do so, common lawyers would do the needful.3 1
Nineteenth-century American common lawyers' turn to history reveals
possible relationships between history and law that are occluded by the Holmesian
antifoundational turn to history to which we are heirs. In order to see this, let us
30. For a discussion of such uses of history, see PARKER, supra note 14, at 168-219.
31. Certain scholars have discussed nineteenth-century lawyers turn to history. A major early
work in this vein is PERRY MILLER, TIE LIFE OF THlE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION
TO THE CIVIT \AR (1965). More recent work, albeit with orientations different from mine, includes
David Rabban, The Historiograph of Late Nineteenth-Centug American Legal Histo), 4 TIEORETICAlL
INQUIRY 1. 541, 568 (2003); Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth-OCentuU Constitutional
Thotgh, 1990 Wis. I. Rv. 1431 (1990); and Steven Wilf, The Invention of Legal Primitivism, 10
TIEORETICAL INQUIRY L. 485 (2009).
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turn to the mechanics of how nineteenth-century American lawyers combined
common law and historical sensibilities.
Armed with the diffuse nonhistorical common law times of "immemoriality"
and "insensibility," convinced of the superiority of the common law method over
that of legislatively generated law, nineteenth-century American legal thinkers
turned to the common law tradition to make sense of pressing issues ranging from
labor to crime, commerce to slavery, marriage to local government, contract to
tort. Even as they turned to the common law tradition, however, nineteenth-
century common lawyers turned to the varying times and logics of history. And it
is here that the conjoining of common law and history reveals something
interesting.
In the first instance, the bringing together of the times of the common law
and the times of history served to subject the common law to history. This was, to
use Gordon's term, "external legal history" to the extent that nineteenth-century
common lawyers relied upon ideas of history outside of the common law itself to
make sense of the common law: law was fitted into time and place, understood in
terms of the imperatives of history, such that it could be subjected to reform.
From the eighteenth century on, English and Scottish political and legal thinkers,
from Bolingbroke to Kames to Blackstone, were acutely aware that the common
law that had come down to them had developed in a land-based feudal society and
that it was inconsistent with the needs of eighteenth-century Britain's commercial
society. History was thus imagined as a move from the feudal to the commercial,
as something that provided a perspective on the existing common law.
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, American political and
legal thinkers continued this trend of subjecting the common law to the
imperatives of history imagined as a move from feudal to commercial, often
transposed onto the shift from monarchy to democracy, from Europe to America.
As the nineteenth century wore on, the imperatives of history changed. By the
mid-nineteenth century, American political and legal thinkers were no longer
preoccupied with plotting a relationship between a prerevolutionary, feudal past
and a postrevolutionary, commercial present and future. The specter of British
influence, so prominent in Jeffersonian and Jacksonian America, waned. At the
same time, as the slavery crisis began to dominate public life, political democracy,
once seen as at least potentially able to allow the laws of nature and society to
flourish, came increasingly to be seen as itself a potentially serious obstacle to the
flourishing of natural and social laws. First the slavery crisis, and then the
centralizing impulses of federal and state regulation, brought about new, but
equally constraining, languages of history, whether Comtean languages of
underlying invariable natural and social laws or Darwinian-Spencerian ones that
plotted history as a slowly but constantly evolving "life." These new historical
languages would also, as had been the case in earlier decades, be used to make
sense of the common law. From the time of the American Revolution going
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forwards, then, American common lawyers judged the common law rigorously in
terms of various prevailing vocabularies and logics of history. Thus judged, parts
of the common law were declared obsolete and excised, others systematized, yet
others reformed or revived. The doing of "external legal history" was ubiquitous,
entirely normal.
Even as they engaged in "external legal history," however, nineteenth-
century common law thinkers would argue that the common law, occasionally as
doctrine but more often as method, itself realized and embodied the logic,
meaning, and direction of foundational and teleological history. In other words,
something akin to what Gordon would call "internal legal history" was
represented as effectuating the movement of "external legal history." Alternatively,
to borrow the terminology that drove the conference that has led to this
Symposium, nineteenth-century lawyers were doing "law and history" and "law as
history," where the former stands for a historical contextualization of law and the
latter stands for a legal contextualization of history. One could offer various
examples of this phenomenon, and I discuss them at considerable length in the
book. Where history was plotted as a shift from feudal to commercial in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the common law was represented as
having worked out that shift; where history was plotted as the progressive
realization of natural "laws" of equality or slavery in the mid-nineteenth century,
the common law was represented as embodying those natural laws; and where
history was plotted as the movement of Darwinian-Spencerian "life" in the late
nineteenth century (often represented as the emergence of an autonomous and
self-regulating private sphere), the common law was represented as capturing
"life" itself. This is curious. It requires a bit of spelling out.
Nineteenth-century common law thinkers were not using history negatively
to pull down law's foundations generally in the manner of Holmes. As such, the
point of doing "external legal history" was not to dissolve the common law into
history, to rob it of its autonomy, and to reduce it to a species of politics. The
common law was to be subjected to remaking in the name of foundational and
teleological history, but the point of doing so was never to surrender the making
of law to democracy, because democracy was itself constrained by foundational
and teleological history. Put differently, common lawy ers' commitment to the
common law's autonomy did not mean that they did not simultaneously think
historically about the common law. It is this fusion of opposites that is hard for us
to inhabit. The times of the common law and the times of history brushed up
against each other, informed each other, constituted each other, without
destroying each other. History was a method of acting upon the common law; the
common law was a method of realizing history. History produced an external
perspective on the nonhistorical common law, but at the same time, the
nonhistorical common law produced an external perspective on history.
Nineteenth-century American common law thinkers reveal themselves, in other
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words, to have been able simultaneously to inhabit two different types of time, the
nonmodern and nonhistorical times of the common law ("internal legal history"
or "law as history") and the varying times of nineteenth-century foundational and
teleological history ("external legal history" or "law and history"). Holding on to
two utterly different kinds of time, setting them in relationship to one another,
required considerable intellectual labor. How to maintain simultaneous affiliations
to a legal tradition that had emerged in the seventeenth century and collapsed
continuity and change, identity and difference, on the one hand, and the historical
imperatives of the nineteenth century, on the other hand?
One is tempted to work out-theoretically-the precise meaning of that
impossible space between "internal legal history" and "external legal history,"
between the nonmodern and nonhistorical times of the common law and the
foundational and teleological times of nineteenth-century history, between "law as
history" and "law and history." Antifoundationalism, I am tempted to say, brings
about the need for naming apouias. But I will refrain from advancing any facile
"philosophical" explanation for why nineteenth-century common lawyers did not
experience as problems what we experience as problems. Suffice it to say that our
problems were not theirs, at least in this rendering of the story. This does not
mean, of course, that the historical record could not be read to find earlier
iterations of our problems: but that would be a different project from the one I
have embarked upon.
CONCLUSION
What does it mean to have historicized the law-politics problem, or the
"internal legal history" versus "external legal history" problem, as I have done?
In drawing attention to the ways in which the common law, history, and
democracy worked together before roughly 1900, I have argued that the law-
politics problem as we know it did not emerge until history began to perform an
antifoundational task, which it did in writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., and
those who claimed him and followed in his wake. A historical sensibility that
undermined law's foundations, to say nothing of history 's own foundations, was
important for the law-politics distinction to present itself in the ways in which we
recognize it. Once we stop believing that history has a foundation and a teleology,
it becomes easier to see law as nothing other than a species of illegitimate politics.
The emergence of this particular law-politics problem growing out of
antifoundational historical thinking transcends the American politico-legal context,
going more generally to philosophical concerns about the status of foundational
thinking after modernism. Philosophers of history have recognized that, since the
late nineteenth century, we have been living in a world "after" metaphysics, where
the world is nothing but history and seems "ever-provisional." 32 Recognizing what
32. Benjamin Barber, quoted in DAVID ROBERIS, NOTIHING BUI 1ISTORY:
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Holmes recognized a century ago when he sought to tear down the foundations of
law in the name of history, Benjamin Barber has written, "[P]olitics is what men
do when metaphysics fails." 33 Democracy, David Roberts writes, "is the form of
interaction for people who cannot agree on moral absolutes." 34 This is the
background of our law-politics problem.
It might be hard to transcend this condition and, as I indicated in the
Introduction, I certainly have no easy answers. Gordon and I share, it must be
recognized, a similar understanding of history and a similar sense of its uses. In his
1975-76 essay, Gordon used it to great effect to undermine a sense of law's
autonomy, whereas I have used it to undermine a sense of the autonomy of the
understanding of history that we both share and to show how law, history, and
democracy interacted before our way of thinking about history became
authoritative. And yet, as David Roberts has written, there is no easy return to the
world of teleologies and foundations. In other words, it might be no rejuvenation
of our historical practices to describe sympathetically, as I have attempted here to
do, the world that preceded them. Only Borges, David Roberts has written wryly,
could write as if it is still 1748.35 That may not be entirely correct (even if it is
correct for Borges). There are examples of foundational and teleological
thinking-imbued with an "as if" character and without-all over the world
today.36 And not all appear particularly desirable.
But I want to end on a positive, explicitly historical and political, note. The
mystery is that many who claimed to follow in Holmes's wake did not share his
rigorous antifoundationalism even as they claimed his legacy in breaking down the
law-politics distinction. Foundational and teleological histories of a liberal stripe
are rife in the American legal academy, even as we are engulfed in historical
accounts that give us more and more "complexity." At certain times, such
foundational and teleological histories frustrate; at other times, they do not.
For example, Akhil Amar approvingly quoted John Hart Ely's Democray and
Distrust "There have also existed throughout our history limits on the extent of
the franchise and thus on government by majority. But the constitutional
development [] has been continuously, even relentlessly, awayjfrom that state of affairs." "As
it turns out," Amar assures his readers, "the amenders [of the U.S. Constitution]
have, in general, been liberal democratic reformers in their eras just as the
Founders were in theirs."3  If the writings of Amar suggest anything, it is that
RECONSTRUCTION AND EXiRENIIIY AFIERMMEIAPIIyCS, at xvii-xix (2007).
33. Id. at xviii-xix.
34. Id.
35. As Roberts puts it, "If I try to be true to the situation of 1748,1 find myslfin the world of
Jorge Luis Borges." Id. at xv.
36. 1 am referring to IHANS VAIIIIN(ER, 11E PHILOSOPHY OF "S IF": A SYSIEM OF E111
THEORETICAL, PRACTICAL AND RELIGTOU S FCTIONS OF MANKIND (C.K. Ogden trans., Barnes &
Noble 2d ed. 1952) (1924).
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American democracy continues to be subjected to foundational and teleological
historical faiths. American constitutionalism-mired in its countermajoritarian
difficulties-continues to marshal a history of ever-expanding circles of rights,
freedoms, and equalities. I myself find it difficult to resist the lure of such
foundational historical thinking, even as I chide myself for giving in to it. Let us
take the question of same-sex marriage. Do developments in Western Europe,
Latin America, and a few progressive American jurisdictions not suggest that
same-sex marriage is something that wi/ happen in the future, that it is something
mandated by the logic of history itself? Does American democracy itself not seem
to be "wrong" to many because of its failure to fall in line with what so clearly
appears to be a historical trend? And is it not law-"internal legal history" or "law
as . . .," linking same-sex marriage with America's history of overcoming racial and
gender discrimination-that appears better positioned to realize this historical
movement than American democratic majorities currently do? In combining
"external legal history" and "internal legal history," "law and history" and "law as
history," we might not, after all, be so different from our nineteenth-century
forebears.
YALE L.1. 1997, 2009 (2006) (emphasis added)
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